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1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
2. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3. See id. at 9 (“[T]he Constitution forbids . . . not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures.” (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
4. Id. at 30.  The investigative detention standard enunciated in Terry is noteworthy in its entirety.
The Court held that the police may conduct such a detention only “where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous.”  Id.
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The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution protects individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures.   Traditionally, the Supreme Court1
has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require warrants supported by
probable cause in both the search and seizure contexts.  In Terry v. Ohio,  the2
Supreme Court recognized that not all interactions between police and citizens
involve intrusions serious enough to trigger the full probable cause standard.3
As a result, the Court delineated a specific, narrowly applicable exception to
the general rule.   The Court held that in situations where the police have4
specific and articulable grounds that provide them with reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot, they may briefly detain an individual for
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5. Id.  It should be noted here that this is only the first of a multi-tiered scheme that the Court
developed to govern each progressive step of the entire police-citizen interaction.  I am dealing here only
with the first—the initial—investigative stop.
6. Regarding the specific facts giving rise to the exception, Justice Warren noted, “[W]e deal here
with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot
observations of the officer on the beat.”  Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
7. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308(b) (1983) (second emphasis added).  The provision makes no
distinction between different sections of the Motor Vehicle Code.  Thus, the authority granted here applies
to police officers’ conduct in situations where they make a stop for a speeding violation and, alternatively,
where they suspect that a motorist is driving under the influence of alcohol.
8. 668 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1995)
9. Id. at 1116.
10. Id.
purposes of investigation.   Both the facts of Terry and the language of Justice5
Warren’s opinion leave no doubt that the exception was to be construed and
applied in only the narrowest of contexts.   However, as lower courts6
interpreted and applied Terry in the following years, the standard enunciated
in Terry blurred considerably.  Hence came the development of the well-
entrenched, but nebulous, investigative detention doctrine.
In 1983, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted title 75, section 6308(b) of
the Pennsylvania Code to provide police officers with a standard for the level
of suspicion necessary to stop a vehicle to enforce the Pennsylvania Vehicle
Code.  The provision, before a recent amendment, provided in pertinent part:
Authority of Police Officer.—Whenever a police officer . . . has articulable and
reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of this title, he may stop a vehicle, upon
request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of
financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or driver’s
license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to
be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.7
Confusion permeated the courts of Pennsylvania at all levels as to the meaning
of the phrase “reasonable and articulable grounds to suspect” in the statute.
Because this language is not the mirror image of either the reasonable
suspicion or probable cause standards set forth by the United States Supreme
Court, Pennsylvania courts’ interpretations were inconsistent and unclear.
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Whitmyer,  the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania8
settled the matter, at least temporarily.   The court concluded that the words9
in the statute required nothing more or less than probable cause, and the
semantic disparity between the two phrases was “nothing more than a
distinction without a difference.”10
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11. For a list and analysis of these cases, see supra Part B(3).
12. 785 A.2d 983 (Pa. 2001).
13. Id. at 985 n.1.
14. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308(b) (West 2004) (emphasis added).
15. The intention has very recently been wholly endorsed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  See
Commonwealth v. Smith, 917 A.2d 848, 850 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).  The court in Smith cited Justice
Eakin’s concurring opinion in Martin v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 438 (Pa. 2006), in support of its
endorsement of the legislative intent of the amendment.  Smith, 917 A.2d at 850.  Notably, Justice Eakin’s
concurrence merely recognized the alteration made by the legislature.  Martin, 905 A.2d at 449-50.
Because the constitutionality of the change was not before the court, it did not decide upon its validity.  Id.
at 450 n.1.
16. See Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261, 271-72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“We hold that the
limited intrusion permitted by Section 6308(b) in the case of a vehicular stop based upon a reasonable
suspicion that the driver is driving under the influence, as balanced against the Commonwealth’s salutary
interest in preventing DUI violations, violates neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I, Section 8.”).
Following a subsequent line of decisions by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, it appeared as if that court was requiring a level of suspicion
lower than that announced in the United States Supreme Court’s original
traffic stop cases and in Whitmyer itself.   The Supreme Court of11
Pennsylvania, in response, decided Commonwealth v. Gleason,  holding that12
the probable cause standard was the only standard to be applied in traffic stop
situations, and that the superior court had mistakenly lowered the standard in
their previous application of the statutory language.   It seemed as if the court13
in Gleason had finally laid to rest any uncertainties about the suspicion
required to make a valid traffic stop.  Then, in 2004, the Pennsylvania
Legislature, in a move no doubt in response to the court’s decision in Gleason,
revised section 6308(b) to read as follows:
(b) Authority of Police Officer.—Whenever a police officer is engaged in a
systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that
a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon
request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of
financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the
driver’s license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably
believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.14
The legislature’s intent here is clear—to lower the standard.   The Supreme15
Court of Pennsylvania has not yet granted allocatur to an appeal regarding the
constitutionality of this change.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court has to this
point upheld the statutory provision against constitutional attacks regarding
the application of the provision in Driving Under the Influence (DUI)
situations.   Although the issue has been presented, the superior court has not16
addressed the constitutionality of its application to routine traffic stops that
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17. See Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272-73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).  The superior court
denied review of the constitutional issue presented by the appellant in the case because it was not properly
preserved at trial.  It finally concluded: “Moreover, appellate review of an order denying suppression is
limited to examination of the precise basis under which suppression initially was sought; no new theories
of relief may be considered on appeal.”  Id. (citations omitted).
18. 889 A.2d 596 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
19. Id. at 601-02.  Judge Gantman noted, “Our Supreme Court in Whitmyer and later in Gleason
referenced Prouse directly in their discussion of probable cause as the appropriate standard for vehicle
stops.  As such, the propriety of the legislative revision is subject to some debate.”  Id. at 602 (referring to
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)).  However, Judge Gantman also noted that the act giving rise to
the controversy before her happened prior to the revision of the statute, and so the constitutionality of the
amendment was not at issue.  Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Ulman, 902 A.2d 514, 517 n.3 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2006) (mirroring Judge Gantman’s reluctance and again not addressing the constitutional issue because
it was not directly before the court).
20. See supra Part B.
21. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
22. Id. at 895.  The court’s framework in Edmunds came in response to the United States Supreme
Court’s requirement that state courts make a plain statement of the “adequate and independent state grounds
upon which [they] rely, in order to avoid any doubt that [they] have rested [their] decision squarely upon
[state] jurisprudence.”  Id. (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)).
are not DUI-related.   Doubt has loomed, however.  In Commonwealth v.17
Anderson,  Superior Court Judge Gantman, in a combination concurring and18
dissenting opinion, noted that although the question was not before her, the
change in the statutory standard was certainly questionable.19
Since neither the Superior Court nor the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has addressed the constitutionality of section 6308(b), particularly regarding
routine, non-DUI-based traffic stops, this Note does just that.  However, the
scope of this Note extends only to section 6308(b) and its validity under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.  No arguments here rest on the Federal
Constitution, and any mention of or analogy thereto are only for purposes of
persuasive comparison.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, when the issue
has been properly preserved before it, has taken the opportunity on a few rare
but increasingly common occasions to interpret the provisions of the state
constitution independently from its federal counterpart.  Conveniently, three
of the seminal cases where it has done so all involved article I, section 8.  This
provision is Pennsylvania’s analogue to the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, protecting citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Not only are the two provisions different in language, but as the state supreme
court has noted, they have different meanings, histories, and purposes.20
In Commonwealth v. Edmunds,  the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for the21
first time developed a framework for independent analysis under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.   In this Note, I use that framework to argue the22
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23. At least three cases are on point here: The Edmunds case itself, Commonwealth v. Matos, 672
A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996), and Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 614 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1992).  These cases will be
discussed at length later in this Note.  It is noteworthy that in two of these cases, Edmunds and Rodriquez,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the standards adopted by the United States Supreme Court
were in direct conflict with article 1, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.  In both cases, the federal
standard was superseded by a more stringent state standard.
24. I am specifically not addressing the reasonable suspicion standard here as applied to DUI
situations.  Those instances arguably present a different issue.
25. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888.  The court also framed the question a second time as “whether the
federal Leon test circumvents the acknowledged deficiencies under Pennsylvania law, and prevents the
suppression of evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant.”  Id. at 891-92.  Since the superior
court below expressly relied on and incorporated Leon into its opinion, the supreme court had no choice
but to address it head-on.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), concerned the constitutionality of
a warrant lacking probable cause on its face.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has interpreted Leon to
hold that “the [Fourth] Amendment does not mandate suppression of illegally seized evidence obtained
pursuant to a constitutionally defective warrant, so long as the police officer acted in good faith reliance
upon the warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.”  Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 892.
following: (1) article I, section 8 of the state constitution affords more
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than does its federal
counterpart; (2) in interpreting article I, section 8, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania has consistently required probable cause for routine traffic
stops; (3) the requirement is based exclusively on state constitutional law (as
opposed to statutory interpretation); (4) article I, section 8 of the state
constitution affords even more protection than that which would be required
to invalidate the reasonable suspicion standard;  and (5) numerous public23
policy considerations in the commonwealth support the retention of the
probable cause standard.  In sum, the Pennsylvania Constitution forbids any
level of suspicion lower than traditional probable cause for traffic stops, and
the state legislature’s amendment of the standard was an unconstitutional
legislative action.24
II.  THE EDMUNDS FRAMEWORK
In Edmunds, the court set out its own plan for how independent analysis
based on the state constitution should proceed.  To understand the case’s
framework, the substance of the holding, and the commentary on the
Pennsylvania Constitution, an overview of some detail is necessary.  First, the
issue presented to the court was “whether Pennsylvania should adopt the
‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule as articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Leon.”   Ultimately, the25
state supreme court held that “a ‘good faith’ exception to the exclusionary rule
would frustrate the guarantees embodied in Article I, Section 8, of the
336 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:331
26. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 888.
27. Id. at 894 (citations omitted).
28. See Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1980).
29. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895.  The court here went into a short discussion of the “New Federalism”
that lately has gained prominence in state court jurisprudence.  State high courts are more and more
undertaking their own constitutional analysis of many of the analogous federal questions going before the
United States Supreme Court.  Id. at 895 n.6.
30. Id. at 895.  From time to time, I will allude to United States Supreme Court precedent in my
analysis.  It is, of course, utilized here only as a means of comparison.
Pennsylvania Constitution.”   From the outset, and without much hesitation,26
one can conclude from the language of the court’s opinion that article I,
section 8 must “embody” some “guarantees” that the Federal Constitution
does not.  Furthermore, the court in Edmunds emphasized that state high
courts “are not bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
which interpret similar (yet distinct) federal constitutional provisions,” and
that the federal standard is only a floor below which state courts cannot go.27
Independent analysis is both permitted and encouraged.28
In its “plain statement” of the four factors to be weighed in the analysis,
the court set out the following for consideration:
(1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision;
(2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-law;
(3) related case-law from other states;
(4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern, and
applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence.29
The court also noted that federal precedent is not totally irrelevant and can be
useful in guiding the analysis.30
III.  ANALYSIS
A.  The Text
A textual comparison of article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution does not
provide much insight into their possible differences.  The text of section 8
provides:
§ 8.  Security from searches and seizures
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
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31. PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895-96 (citing Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Pa.
1987)).
34. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 642 (N.Y. 2001).  The court concluded that the
similarity between New York’s provision and the analogous federal provision was determinative in holding
that the two afforded similar protections.  Interestingly, the court in Robinson was addressing Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), and the validity of pretextual traffic stops.  Like Whren, the Robinson
court held pretext to be of no significance in the validity of the stop, as long as probable cause was present
at the outset.  Robinson, 767 N.E.2d at 638.
35. Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 772 (Pa. 1996) (citing Edwards, 586 A.2d at 896).
36. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896 (“The Pennsylvania Constitution was therefore meant to reduce to
writing a deep history of unwritten legal and moral codes which had guided the colonists from the
beginning of William Penn’s charter in 1681.  Unlike the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the
affiant.31
The text of the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.32
At first blush, the two provisions seem rather similar, even identical, in nature,
text, and purpose.  However, the state supreme court has time and again
reiterated that the textual similarity between the two provisions does not bind
the court to making identical interpretations of each.   This is an important33
premise.  Other states that have interpreted their own constitutional provisions
to afford the same protections as the Fourth Amendment do, at the outset,
claim that the identical language between the two is of conclusive
significance.   The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, has flatly rejected34
this proposition.   An examination of the differences in the history and35
purpose between the two provisions reveals much difference indeed.
B.  History
1.  The Language
The court in Edmunds underwent an extensive analysis of the history of
article I, section 8.  It noted that the provision is a decade older than its federal
counterpart and has its origins in the original state constitution of 1776.36
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. . . the Declaration of Rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution was an organic part of the state’s original
constitution of 1776 . . . .” (citation omitted)).
37. PA. CONST. of 1776, cl. X.  The text of Clause 10 of the original constitution of 1776 provides:
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers and possessions free
from search and seizure; and therefore warrants, without oaths or affirmations first made,
affording a sufficient foundation for them, and . . . not particularly described, are contrary to
that right, and ought not be granted.
Id.
38. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 896 (citing WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS
61 (1980)); see also Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (Pa. 1983).  In interpreting the state
constitution, the court in Sell concluded that “[i]n construing Article I, section 8, we find it highly
significant that the language employed in that provision does not vary in any significant respect from the
words of its counterpart in our first constitution.  The text of Article I, section 8 thus provides no basis for
the conclusion that the philosophy and purpose it embodies today differs from those which first prompted
the Commonwealth to guarantee protection from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”  Id.
39. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 897.
40. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
391-93 (1914).  A second purpose that has been posited by the Supreme Court is “judicial integrity.”
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).  The Court in Terry emphasized that “[c]ourts which
sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights
of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.”  Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
41. See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, and
Examining the language of the original provision, it is clear that the idea of a
requirement of particularized suspicion for issuing warrants was contemplated
in 1776 upon the ratification of the document.   This all came well before the37
Framers of the Fourth Amendment endeavored to set down on paper the
protections in that provision.   The Edmunds court came to this very38
conclusion, stating that “at the time the Pennsylvania Constitution was drafted
in 1776, the issue of searches and seizures unsupported by probable cause was
of utmost concern to the constitutional draftsmen.”   Hence, the probable39
cause standard developed in Pennsylvania, even more so than in states whose
constitutions post-dated the Federal Constitution, has a scope and purpose
uniquely independent from the Fourth Amendment.
2.  The Purpose
The state prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
remarkably different than the federal prohibition.  The United States Supreme
Court has made it clear that the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment is
to deter police misconduct.   Thus, the federal exclusionary rule, by which40
illegally seized evidence is kept outside the purview of a jury, operates as a
mechanism to enforce fundamental constitutional rights—it is a remedy.41
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Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1384 (1983).
Retired Justice Potter Stewart concluded that as a matter of history, “the exclusion of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence is not a constitutional right, but a constitutional remedy.”  Id.
42. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 897.
43. 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983).
44. Id. at 467.  The Sell opinion is yet another example of a situation where, in conducting an
independent analysis under the state constitution, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected a federal rule
based on the Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 468.  This case, along with the substance of Edmunds and Matos
will be more thoroughly distilled later in this Note.
45. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 898 (citations omitted).  In Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254 (Pa.
1987), the court outlined the twin aims of the provision: the safeguarding of privacy and the fundamental
requirement that warrants shall only be issued upon probable cause.
46. 555 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1987).
47. Id. at 1258 (emphasis added).  In fact, in each seminal case where the court has interpreted
article I, section 8 against the Fourth Amendment, it has found greater inherent protections.  In several
cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has refused to apply a federal constitutional doctrine because it
was in direct conflict with the state constitutional provision.  See, e.g., Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991)
(rejecting the federal “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule); Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d
769 (Pa. 1996) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s seizure analysis in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621
(1991)); Commonwealth v. Dejohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979) (rejecting the Supreme Court’s privacy
analysis in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)).
Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, however, has a
significantly different purpose.  The right to privacy, unlike that at the federal
level, has existed in Pennsylvania since time out of mind.  The court in
Edmunds noted that article I, section 8 is “meant to embody a strong notion of
privacy, carefully safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the past two
centuries.”   In Commonwealth v. Sell,  the court, again construing article I,42 43
section 8, concluded that
the survival of the language now employed in article I, section 8 through over 200
years of profound change in other areas demonstrates that the paramount concern for
privacy first adopted as a part of our organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the
mandate of the people of this Commonwealth.44
Thus the central theme of the provision is privacy, not deterring police
misconduct.  A long line of cases starting in the 1970s clearly conclude that
“Article I, Section 8 is unshakably linked to a right of privacy in this
Commonwealth.”   Most recently, the state supreme court in Commonwealth45
v. Melilli  concluded that “Article 1, [Section] 8 of the Pennsylvania46
Constitution . . . may be employed to guard individual privacy rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures more zealously than the federal
government does under the Constitution of the United States by serving as an
independent source of supplemental rights.”   The thrust of the provision is47
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48. 307 A.2d 875 (Pa. 1973).
49. Id. at 876-77.
50. Id. at 877.
51. Id. at 879.
52. Id. at 878.  Despite the fact that the Commonwealth argued that the “automobile is a dangerous
instrumentality, one of the nation’s highest ranking causes of death, bodily injury and destruction of
property,” the court was not convinced that such an interest outweighed the importance of some level of
suspicion.  Id.
53. Id.  If police had such discretion, the court noted, it could be used “arbitrarily, or as a guise for
seeking evidence of other crimes, or on mere ‘fishing expeditions.’”  Id. at 879.
54. Id. at 879.
clear: It serves to protect the privacy interests of Pennsylvania citizens.
3.  The Case Law
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of the probable cause
standard began with Commonwealth v. Swanger.   In Swanger, the defendant48
was arrested and convicted of burglary based upon evidence seized during a
routine traffic stop by the police.   The police officer had no level of49
suspicion to make the stop and testified that he “saw nothing unusual about
the vehicle or the manner in which it was operated before he ordered the
stop.”   The court held the stop invalid, and all evidence derived therefrom50
was suppressed.   While Swanger involved a purely arbitrary stop made with51
no level of suspicion and involved only the Fourth Amendment, it is
significant for several reasons.  First, the court for the first time balanced the
competing interests of the driver and the police during a traffic stop.
Balancing these competing interests, the court concluded that the individual’s
right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions outweighed the
ability of the government to stop automobiles at random to ensure public
safety.   Second, a prime concern of the court was that police officers not be52
given “unreviewable discretion and authority to intrude into an individual’s
life for no cause whatsoever.”   Third, and most important, was the specific53
rule set out in Swanger.  The court held that “before a police officer may stop
a single vehicle to determine whether or not the vehicle is being operated in
compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code, he must have probable cause based
on specific facts which indicate to him either the vehicle or the driver are in
violation of the code.”54
Two important contextual points should be noted about the holding in
Swanger.  First, the Commonwealth’s argument was largely based on a
statutory provision in the Motor Vehicle Code granting police officers
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55. 75 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1221(b) (West 1973) (repealed 1976).  The language of the statute read
in pertinent part:
Any peace officer, who shall be in uniform, and shall exhibit his badge or other sign of
authority, shall have the right to stop any vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of
inspecting the said vehicle, as to its equipment and operation . . . and securing of such other
information as may be necessary.
Id.  Even though the language of the statute clearly intends to grant police very broad authority, the court
here seems to have read into it the constitutional standard of probable cause.
56. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 253 A.2d 276 (Pa. 1969).
57. Hicks was a case with facts strikingly similar to those in Terry.  The defendant was stopped and
patted down by police officers on a street in Philadelphia.  Id. at 277.  The court in Hicks concluded that
the seizure was unconstitutional.  Id. at 280.  The standard adopted was virtually the same as that in
Terry—that “police must prove that specific conduct of the seized person, observed by them, justified and
made reasonable their belief that criminal activity was afoot and that the seized person was armed and
dangerous.”  Id. at 279.
58. 331 A.2d 414 (Pa. 1975).
59. Id. at 416.
60. Id.
seemingly unlimited discretion to stop automobiles for a number of
purposes.   The court’s holding is not based in any part upon the statute, nor55
on its intended purpose.  The analysis involves solely constitutional principles.
Second, the decision came down in 1973, a full five years after the Terry
decision and four years after the court incorporated the Terry standard into
Pennsylvania law.   The court was well aware of Terry’s reasonable suspicion56
standard but did not rely on it,  and for good reason.  The court was likely not57
willing to make the logical leap required to connect the Terry standard with
stopping an automobile for purposes of enforcing the Motor Vehicle Code.
Different situations—it would seem—require different standards.
The next major case addressing the probable cause standard was
Commonwealth v. Murray.   In Murray, the defendant, while driving his58
automobile, was stopped by a police officer in connection with a burglary
close by.   As the police were following the vehicle, “no traffic laws were59
violated nor was there any indication of anything unusual either about the
appearance of the vehicle or the behavior of its occupants.”   Evidence60
obtained from the stop led to the defendant’s conviction.  In reversing the
decision of the superior court and granting the defendant’s suppression
motion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated with considerable strength
the standard set forth in Swanger only two years before.  The court concluded:
It is thus certain that in this Commonwealth we will not permit the State under the
guise of regulating the operation of motor vehicles upon the highway to single out
vehicles for routine stops. . . . If the alleged basis of a vehicular stop is to permit a
determination whether there has been compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code of
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61. Murray, 331 A.2d at 416-17 (footnote omitted) (citing Commonwealth v. Swanger, 307 A.2d
875, 879 (Pa. 1973); Commonwealth v. Boyer, 314 A.2d 317, 318 (1974)).
62. Id. at 418.
63. Id.  The court’s language is telling of its view of the separate and distinct nature of the two
situations presented by (1) suspected violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, and (2) suspected criminal
activity in which the occupants of a vehicle have participated.  Upon review of the Terry standard, the court
stated that “[t]hus, it is also clear that an investigative stop of a moving vehicle to be valid must be based
upon objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the detained motorist is presently involved in
criminal activity.”  Id. (emphasis added).  That criminal activity, as viewed by the court, does not logically
include violations of the Motor Vehicle Code.  Such violations are to be analyzed separately under the
probable cause standard.
64. Id. at 417 (“Under the facts of the instant cause the record is barren of any evidence to suggest
a basis for concluding that either the vehicle or its occupants were in any way in violation of the Code.”).
this Commonwealth, it is encumbent upon the officer to articulate specific facts
possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable
cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of
the Code.61
The standard here is clear.  When vehicle is stopped based upon a perceived
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, probable cause is the only sufficient
level of suspicion.
Even more important in Murray, however, is the bifurcated analysis that
the court performed between the probable cause and reasonable suspicion
standards.  It is here that we find the court first addressing Terry’s
investigative detention standard and how it applies in the automobile stop
context.  After analyzing the issue regarding the Motor Vehicle Code violation
and concluding that probable cause was not present, the court turned to Terry.
The court acknowledged that “[b]ecause a motorist’s extreme mobility may
otherwise allow him to avoid police confrontation, the State has an equally
strong interest in these cases in stopping a moving vehicle to freeze
momentarily a situation of suspected criminality.”   Under the Terry standard,62
the only evidence the Commonwealth proffered in support of reasonable
suspicion was that the defendant, while parked in a driveway nearby the place
of the burglary, assumedly left when he saw the police car.   No evidence of63
a suspected violation of the Vehicle Code was offered in support of a finding
of reasonable suspicion.   This does not come as a surprise.  The court made64
two very distinct analyses in the case.  It applied the probable cause standard
to stops for suspected violations of the Vehicle Code and the reasonable
suspicion standard as set forth in Terry and Hicks to situations where other
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65. See id. at 417-18.
66. Swanger and Murray were both decided before the original version of title 75, section 6308(b)
of the Pennsylvania Code was enacted.  The significance of this point is minimal.  The standards set forth
in both cases, particularly in Swanger where a statutory provision was at issue, did not rest on the
interpretation of any authority granted by the legislature.  Although such authority may be given by statute,
it may not go beyond the protections that the state constitution affords to citizens of the commonwealth.
67. 668 A.2d 1113 (Pa. 1995).
68. Id. at 1117 (citing 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308(b) (2004)).
69. Id. at 1114.
70. Id. at 1114-15.
71. Id. at 1115-16.
72. Id. at 1116.  I believe the court was being rather considerate here.  It is certainly plausible that
the legislature intended to statutorily lower the standard applicable to these kinds of stops in their first
enactment of this provision.  The court here seems to be reading the probable cause standard into the
statutory language in order to avoid striking it down on constitutional grounds—something all high courts
avoid if at all possible.  The amended version of the statute, in its starkly different language, will hopefully
not be met with the same benevolence.
criminal activity was suspected.   Again, different standards apply to different65
situations.66
In the next seminal case, Commonwealth v. Whitmyer,  the court for the67
first time took the opportunity to address the legislature’s 1983 enactment of
title 75, section 6308(b) of the Pennsylvania Code, allowing for stops by
police officers having “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a
violation” of the Vehicle Code.   In Whitmyer, the defendant crossed over the68
white line to pass another car, and was stopped by a police officer who
apparently intended to cite him for driving at an unsafe speed.   Upon69
approaching the defendant to issue the citation, the trooper observed the smell
of marijuana, found the substance in defendant’s coat pocket, and charged him
with various possession offenses and driving at an unsafe speed.   After the70
defendant’s motion to suppress was granted by the trial court and affirmed by
the superior court, the Commonwealth argued that both courts erred both in
applying the probable cause standard set forth in Swanger and Murray and in
ignoring the language of the statute.   The supreme court rejected the notion.71
It concluded that “when we balance the underlying interests of the individual
and the government, the two standards amount to nothing more than a
distinction without a difference.”   Again, it is important to note here that the72
court’s decision did not come as a principle of statutory construction.  Its
conclusion that the language in the statute could mean nothing less than
probable cause came after balancing the interests involved.  This is the classic
constitutional analysis that the court applied in Swanger and affirmed in
Murray.
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73. Id.  The statute was repealed in 1976.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1118 (“[T]his is not a case where further investigation would lead to a discovery of a
violation of the Vehicle Code.  If the trooper was unable to clock Appellee for three-tenths of a mile or
observe the conditions that would warrant a citation for driving at an unsafe speed, there is no further
evidence that could be obtained from a subsequent stop and investigation.”).
76. 785 A.2d 983 (Pa. 2001).
77. Id. at 985.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 986.
80. Id.
The court also rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that the probable
cause requirement in Swanger and Murray came only in response to the
unlimited authority granted to police officers by the statute at issue in
Swanger, title 75, section 1221(b) of the Pennsylvania Code.   Essentially, the73
court repeated once again that probable cause, is probable cause, is probable
cause.   The standard is the same, no matter the statutory language that is74
used by the legislature to grant the authority to police officers.  The court went
on to note that when a police officer stops a vehicle for a violation of the
Vehicle Code, no further investigation is necessary after the stop.  Either the
violation is witnessed, creating probable cause for the stop, or it is not; hence
the distinction again between traffic stops and situations where it is necessary
to stop a vehicle for suspected criminal activity (where further investigation
is the precise purpose of the stop).   Terry is therefore inapplicable, both on75
its law and its facts.
The final significant clarification of the law by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in this area came in Commonwealth v. Gleason.   In that case,76
the defendant was cited for a non-DUI traffic offense.   In customary fashion,77
upon approaching the defendant to issue the citation, the police officer
“observed signs of intoxication and performed field sobriety tests,” which lead
to an ultimate arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.   On appeal78
from the defendant’s denied motion to suppress, the superior court weighed
the sufficiency of the evidence on a reasonable suspicion standard.   The79
defendant argued that the superior court, in an unpublished decision,
impermissibly lowered the standard as set forth in Whitmyer.   The supreme80
court agreed.  In assessing its holdings in Swanger, Murray, and Whitmyer, the
court concluded, once again, that the presence of the statutory grant of
authority did not change the probable cause requirement for traffic stops.  In
finding the stop of the defendant justified, the superior court had
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81. Id. at 989.  The court cited a very large portion of the Whitmyer opinion in its analysis.  In doing
so, it reiterated the point that the basis of the court’s previous decisions regarding the probable cause
standard were not based on statutory interpretation.  As discussed above, the court rejected this argument
in Whitmyer and Gleason.  The analysis was based on the competing interests of citizen privacy and public
road safety.  In each case, inevitably because of the right to privacy under article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, the citizens’ right to be left alone tipped the scale.  See generally
Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 668 A.2d 1113, 1115-18 (Pa. 1995); Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d
983, 988-89 (Pa. 2001).
82. 767 A.2d 1065 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), rev’d, 796 A.2d 965 (Pa. 2002).
83. 762 A.2d 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
84. 737 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
85. 683 A.2d 303 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
86. Jacob C. McCrea, Comment, Reasonable Suspicion, Probable Cause, or Something in Between:
What is the Standard for a Valid Vehicle Stop in Drunk Driving Cases, And Will Courts Adhere to the
Standard?, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 559, 573-74 (2004).  McCrea puts forth an excellent summary of the law in
this area up to and through the Gleason opinion.  He argues that not only has probable cause been the
unwavering standard of the state supreme court, but also that Terry does not provide an appropriate
standard to govern traffic stops.  Id. at 575.
87. McCrea also notes how “[r]ambling dicta and the careless use of terms of art in judicial opinions
describing the standard add to the confusion surrounding this issue.”  Id. at 574.
impermissibly lowered the standard necessary for a proper vehicle stop to
reasonable suspicion.81
A series of superior court opinions handed down between Whitmyer and
Gleason further confused the law.  In Commonwealth v. Baumgardner,82
Commonwealth v. Howard,  Commonwealth v. Masters,  and83 84
Commonwealth v. Lawrentz,  the superior court deviated from the supreme85
court’s pronouncement in Whitmyer and applied a reasonable suspicion
standard in each case.  As one commentator has noted:
[I]n light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s longstanding commitment to
probable cause as the standard, judicial opinions stating or implying that reasonable
suspicion is the standard simply should not be issued.  While reasonable jurists and
attorneys may differ over how poorly a motorist must drive to reach the threshold of
probable cause, it is sad to find that Pennsylvania’s lower courts have often failed to
apply the correct standard.86
The superior court’s somewhat confusing decisions in this area not only apply
the wrong standard, but since many of them were never appealed to the state
supreme court, they also left unchallenged law on the books until the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Gleason.  Having two apparent
standards in the commonwealth during this period no doubt confused judge
and practitioner alike.   Indeed, another commentator has noted:87
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88. Joseph E. Vogrin, III, DUI Traffic Stops in Pennsylvania: Changed Forever After Gleason and
its Progeny, 5 LAWYERS. J., Feb. 7, 2003, at 6, available at 5 No. 3 Lawyers J. 6 (WestLaw).
89. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6308(b) (West 2004).  As amended, the statute now uses the express
term “reasonable suspicion.”  Id.
90. 75 Pa. D. & C.4th 564 (Pa. C.P. Ct. Armstrong County 2005).
91. Id. at 566; see also 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3702 (West 1996) (limitations on backing).
92. Id. at 568.
[S]ince Gleason, it also appears clear that the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court will no
longer tolerate the lesser standard of articulable and reasonable grounds for traffic
stops.  Rather, if the alleged basis of the traffic stop is to permit a determination of
whether there was compliance with the Vehicle Code, it is incumbent upon the police
officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned
stop, which would provide probable cause to believe the vehicle or the driver was
in violation of a particular section of the Vehicle Code.88
The problems with the conclusion here are clear.  First, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court never tolerated a lesser standard for traffic stops—the standard
has always been probable cause.  The main reason that the reasonable
suspicion standard has weighed in the analysis of opinions in the
commonwealth is the superior court’s current entertainment of this standard
in traffic stop cases.  Second, a cursory review of the law brings about the
conclusion that the “articulable and reasonable grounds” statutory standard
meant nothing less than probable cause.  In Whitmyer, the supreme court wrote
this interpretation into its own jurisprudence.
In 2004, in response to the court’s holding in Gleason, the Pennsylvania
legislature lowered the statutory level of suspicion required for police officers
to make traffic stops.   Any hope of clarity in the law after Gleason was now89
extinguished.  In a series of difficult cases, the superior court effectively
deviated from the supreme court’s standard.  Although the probable cause rule
was not ever based on statutory interpretation, the legislature’s decision to
lower the standard apparently held preeminent sway with the superior court.
Before I turn my attention to those cases, however, one trial court opinion
is worth noting.  In Commonwealth v. Erdley,  the Court of Common Pleas90
of Armstrong County ruled on a suppression motion brought by a defendant
stopped for allegedly violating the Motor Vehicle Code.   The defendant91
argued that the police officer did not have probable cause to make the stop,
and the court agreed and granted the motion.   The trial court took into92
consideration that the statutory standard governing this area had recently been
changed by the legislature to require only reasonable suspicion.  However,
because of the supreme court’s ruling in Gleason, the trial court applied the
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93. Id. at 567-68.  The court specifically stated: “The new version of § 6308(b), which became
effective February 1, 2004, appears to create a less stringent standard for making a lawful traffic stop.
However, in view of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Gleason, that the
probable cause standard applies to traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
regardless of whatever other statutory language authorizes such stops, it appears that probable cause
continues to be the applicable standard and the court will apply that standard here.”  Id. (citation omitted).
94. 887 A.2d 261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
95. Id. at 264.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 262; see 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3802(a)(1), (c), 3309(1) (West 2006).
98. Sands, 887 A.2d at 267.
99. Id. at 270.  The court noted that “a suspected violation for DUI is in fact a scenario where further
investigation almost invariably leads to the most incriminating type of evidence, i.e., strong odor of alcohol,
slurred speech, and blood shot eyes.  This type of evidence can only be obtained by a stop and
investigation.”  Id.
100. Id. at 270.
probable cause standard, notwithstanding any statutory language to the
contrary.93
The superior court’s first significant run-in with the amended statute and
its validity came in Commonwealth v. Sands.   In Sands, the defendant was94
stopped by a police officer after the officer had followed him for several
miles.   Upon stopping the defendant, the officer detected a strong odor of95
alcohol.  After approaching the defendant and speaking with him, the officer
noticed that the defendant also used slurred speech and had bloodshot eyes.96
The defendant was charged and convicted of both driving under the influence
and not driving in a single lane.   However, it is unclear from the record as97
reviewed by the superior court which offense lead to the initial stop.  The
court apparently saw no significance in the distinction.  The defendant brought
an appeal before the superior court, challenging the constitutionality of the
amended version of section 6308(b).  In addressing the challenge, the superior
court assumed that the justification for the stop was a perceived violation of
the DUI provision of the Motor Vehicle Code.  In its analysis, the court
addressed the standard set out in Swanger, Murray, Whitmyer, and Gleason,
and concluded that “all these cases reaffirm the court’s holding in Whitmyer
that the police must have probable cause to stop a vehicle for a suspected
violation of the Vehicle Code.”98
The court argued, however, that unlike the scenario in Whitmyer, in a
situation where the initial stop was based on a perceived DUI violation, a
further investigation would serve valid purposes.   In doing so, the court99
recognized that courts in Pennsylvania treat vehicular stops differently
depending on the nature of the suspected violation of the Vehicle Code.   As100
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101. Id. at 271-72.  The court noted: “[O]ur decision here is limited to the constitutionality of Section
6308(b) in so far as it permits an officer to stop a vehicle based upon a reasonable suspicion that the driver
is operating the vehicle under the influence of alcohol.  Thus, we are not here addressing whether the statute
comports with federal and state constitutional protections discussed in cases such as Gleason or Whitmyer
where the suspected violation was not DUI.”  Id. at 270.
102. Even though the reasonableness of DUI stops based on reasonable suspicion may not be as
questionable as normal traffic stops, the apparent inconsistency between the standards will remain as long
as the criminal DUI statutes remain part of the Motor Vehicle Code.  In lumping different levels of
suspicion into a single statute, the legislature has, in effect, created its own problem.
103. Sands, 887 A.2d at 268.  There are additional problems with the legislative history relied upon
by the superior court in coming to their conclusion.  I will address them in the policy section of my analysis.
a result, the court held that “the limited intrusion permitted by Section 6308(b)
in the case of a vehicular stop based upon a reasonable suspicion that the
driver is driving under the influence, as balanced against the Commonwealth’s
salutary interest in preventing DUI violations, violates neither the Fourth
Amendment nor Article I, Section 8.”   Only the constitutionality of the101
statute regarding DUI stops was addressed.  This conclusion, of course, does
not get past the fact that the statute applies to all stops under the Motor
Vehicle Code, including those of a non-DUI nature.  It also does not
sufficiently deal with the point that, although the court in Whitmyer stated that
further investigation would not have any value in the cases of a non-DUI
violation, the standard announced in Whitmyer applies to all traffic stops,
however construed.102
The superior court in Sands addressed, to an extent, the legislative intent
behind the statute.  It concluded that the intent behind the statute was
addressed specifically at DUI cases, and in that capacity, the legislative intent
was valid.   While the court’s conclusion about legislative intent is correct,103
the problems that it presents are clear.  The legislature intended to lower the
standard regarding DUI stops.  However, as the DUI statute remains part of
the Motor Vehicle Code, attempts to lower the constitutional standard set by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will affect all provisions in the Code,
however minor.  It is true that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has permitted
the reasonable suspicion standard to govern Terry-type automobile stops when
criminal activity may be afoot (e.g., the court’s example of vehicular
homicide).  Obviously, that crime is not part of the Motor Vehicle Code.  And
so, the legislature, intending to “lower” the standard regarding DUI stops
because of their proximity to other criminal activity, in effect lowered the
standard for DUI stops and other minor violations under the Motor Vehicle
2007] TRAFFIC STOPS, REASONABLE SUSPICION, AND PENNSYLVANIA 349
104. This problem is the very reason why some states have separated their DUI statutes from their
vehicle codes, making the latter non-criminal.
105. 902 A.2d 514 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), appeal denied, 916 A.2d 1102 (Pa. 2007).
106. Id. at 516.
107. The facts in this case were not fully recounted.  The court stated: “When officer Lash approached
the vehicle, he saw that it was driven by Appellant.  It is undisputed that at the time of the traffic stop
Appellant’s blood alcohol content was above the legal limit.”  Id.  The case does not provide the method
by which the BAC was tested, the citation of the traffic offenses, or any other procedural facts from the
encounter.
108. Id. at 517.  The purpose of this conclusion is unclear.  The DUI-relatedness of the Sands analysis
makes it of little relevance in Ulman.  See also id. at 517 n.3 (noting Judge Gantman’s dissent in
Commonwealth v. Anderson and questioning the validity of the statutory amendment).  Again, as in
Anderson, the issue was not properly presented to the court in Ulman.
109. Ulman, 902 A.2d at 517.
110. Id. at 518 (citation omitted).
Code.   The analysis for each type of violation, however, is not governed by104
such a uniform standard.
A second major case involving the newly amended statute is
Commonwealth v. Ulman.   In Ulman, the defendant was stopped by a police105
officer for two alleged violations of the Vehicle Code: driving at an unsafe
speed and failing to proceed through an emergency response area with
caution.   The defendant was ultimately charged with DUI, but it is unclear106
from the opinion whether the original violations were ever prosecuted.   At107
trial, the defendant’s suppression motion was denied.  On appeal, the superior
court rested its entire opinion on the amended version of the statute.  The
court did not address the constitutionality of the statute as applied to non-DUI
stops, but it did note that regarding DUI stops, the court in Sands found the
statute to be constitutionally firm.   The court proceeded to disregard all of108
the appellant’s arguments because appellant alluded to cases prior to the 2004
amendment, which, according to the court, no longer applied.   The court109
then concluded:
The legislative history of this amendment clearly indicates that it was the
Legislature’s intent to authorize police officers to stop a vehicle based upon a
“reasonable suspicion” that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code, rather than the
heightened standard of probable cause which was applied in Whitmyer.  Since
Whitmyer was decided under former Section 6308(b), which required a stricter
standard for a traffic stop than the current version of the statute, Whitmyer is not
controlling precedent in the present matter.110
The court’s reasoning is not only erroneous, but it is also circular.  First, as I
have pointed out up to this point, the court’s decision in Whitmyer (and
Murray and Swanger) was not based on statutory interpretation.  Furthermore,
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111. Id. at 519.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court has been presented with the issue of the
constitutionality of section 6308(b), in one form or another, on several occasions.  It declined each time to
squarely address the issue.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spease, 911 A.2d 952, 959 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
The defendant in Spease challenged the constitutionality of section 6308(b), this time specifically under
article I, section 8.  The court, with no analysis, concluded that “Sands is binding upon this Court and we
are not at liberty to overrule it.”  Id.  See also Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2006) (declining to consider the constitutionality of section 6308(b) because the defendant did not
properly perserve the issue for appeal); Commonwealth v. Cook, 865 A.2d 869, 873 n.1 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004) (disregarding any constitutionality concerns as being beyond the scope of their decision since the
stop satisfied the higher probable cause standard).
112. 889 A.2d 587 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
113. Barber, 889 A.2d at 593 (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wiley, 858 A.2d 1191,
1194 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) and Commonwealth v. Lohr, 715 A.2d 459, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)).  Not
only does the officer not necessarily have to observe the suspected activity, he does not need actual
knowledge that the activity not being witnessed is criminal.  See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185,
1189 (Pa. 2004).
the “stricter standard” that the court speaks of was read into the statute in
Whitmyer by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court itself.  Basically, the superior
court in Ulman concluded that because the prior statute, as interpreted in
Whitmyer, required a heightened standard, and the legislature clearly intended
to lower the standard, Whitmyer no longer applies because it was decided
under the prior version of the statute, which required a stricter standard as
interpreted in Whitmyer, etc. . . . The reasoning is tortured indeed.  The Ulman
court finally concluded that the police officer in Ulman had reasonable
suspicion to stop the defendant, and the conviction for DUI was affirmed.111
One might ask: What is the difference between these two standards?
Regarding traffic stops, the distinction may not seem to make a big difference.
I will address the significance of the distinction in more depth in the policy
section of this Note, but it is important to note now that the standards have
taken on different meanings in Pennsylvania.  For example, in Commonwealth
v. Barber,  the superior court stated that to meet the standard of reasonable112
suspicion, an officer must
point to specific and articulable facts which, together with the rational inferences
therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion.  “In ascertaining the existence of
reasonable suspicion, we must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.”
“. . . [P]olice officers need not personally observe the illegal or suspicious
conduct, but may rely upon the information of third parties, including ‘tips’ from
citizens.”113
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114. The United States Supreme Court has also noted that “[r]easonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established
with information that is different in quantity or content than that required for probable cause, but also in
the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause.”  Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
115. 859 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
116. Id. at 821.
117. Id. at 823.
118. Id.
119. 802 A.2d 652 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
120. Id. at 657.  The court concluded, particularly regarding DUI violations, that “we might extract
the conclusion that there is no basis for ‘profiling’ a suspected drunk driver merely on the basis of observing
undisciplined operation of a vehicle which does not form the basis for a conclusion that there has been a
violation of the Vehicle Code.”  Id.
121. One of the main causes of this haziness, particularly in Pennsylvania cases, is the confused state
of the arguments at the trial level.  Because the standard has been unstable and unsure for many years,
attorneys have, quite erroneously, argued in suppression motions that a particular search or seizure did not
have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to support it.  The courts make their conclusions of law
accordingly, either affirming that the search or seizure had both probable cause and reasonable suspicion,
or concluding that it had neither.
It is clear that to meet the reasonable suspicion standard, a police officer need
not actually observe the traffic violation in order to stop the driver.   The114
probable cause standard is different; to have probable cause, a police officer
will almost necessarily have to observe the traffic violation before he may pull
the defendant over.  Indeed, a violation alone may not be enough in some
circumstances.  In Commonwealth v. Garcia,  the police officer observed the115
defendant drive over the right berm line two times, each time maneuvering in
response to other oncoming vehicles.   The conduct took place over a two-116
block area.   The superior court concluded that “where a vehicle is driven117
outside the lane of traffic for just a momentary period of time and in a minor
manner, a traffic stop is unwarranted.”   Similarly, in Commonwealth v.118
Battaglia,  the court concluded that an officer’s perception that a defendant119
was driving erratically because he weaved within his lane, drove five to ten
miles per hour under the speed limit, and crossed over the white fog line, was
insufficient to establish probable cause to support the ensuing traffic stop.120
The practical difference between the two standards is clear, even if the legal
distinction is hazy.121
4.  Other Independent Analyses
A long line of cases in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
addressed federal constitutional cases and their application in Pennsylvania
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122. 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979).
123. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
124. The Supreme Court’s rationale was that a depositor had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in bank records (which the court saw as property of the bank).  Hence, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment were not implicated.
125. DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1291.  The court noted that because “Miller establishes a dangerous
precedent, with great potential for abuse, we decline to follow that case when construing the state
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.”  Id. at 1289.
126. 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983).
127. Id. at 458.
128. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
129. Id. at 94.
130. Id.
also supports a conclusion that the reasonable suspicion standard, as applied
to traffic stops, is not acceptable under the Pennsylvania Constitution.  In fact,
in each case where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court undertook an independent
analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution, it relied on the semantic
differences between article I, section 8 and the Fourth Amendment in refusing
to apply federal precedent to Pennsylvania case law.  First, in Commonwealth
v. DeJohn,  the state supreme court refused to adopt the United States122
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Miller.   The Court in Miller123
held that the Fourth Amendment did not protect a depositor from the seizure
of his bank records.   In recognizing that article I, section 8 specifically124
embodies a privacy right not found in the Fourth Amendment, the court in
DeJohn held that in Pennsylvania, under the state constitution, bank customers
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in records pertaining to their affairs
at the bank.125
Later, in Commonwealth v. Sell,  the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was126
once again faced with an issue that would force it to decide whether or not to
adopt a United States Supreme Court holding.  In Sell, the issue was “whether,
under Article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which guarantees
the citizens of this Commonwealth protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures, a defendant accused of a possessory crime will continue to have
‘automatic standing’ to challenge the admissibility of evidence alleged to be
the fruit of an illegal search and seizure.”   The United States Supreme127
Court, in United States v. Salvucci,  abolished the automatic standing rule in128
favor of the “legitimate expectation of privacy” test.   In order to bring a129
motion to suppress allegedly illegal evidence, one would have to show a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the thing seized.   The court in Sell130
declined to adopt that approach in Pennsylvania, again stressing the
differences between the two provisions and the heightened protections of
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131. Sell, 479 A.2d at 467-69.
132. 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987).
133. Id. at 78.
134. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
135. Id. at 703.
136. Johnston, 530 A.2d 79.
137. Id.  According to the Johnston court, the exigencies required for Terry to apply were not present
in the case.  Id.
138. Id.  The court held that the detection tactics could only be used when “(1) the police are able to
articulate reasonable grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the place they seek to test; and
(2) the police are lawfully present in the place where the canine sniff is conducted.”  Id.
139. 672 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996).
140. It should not be forgotten that in Edmunds itself the court declined to follow federal precedent
in construing article I, section 8 (regarding the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).  Edmunds is
article I, section 8.   Automatic standing to bring a motion to suppress would131
remain part of Pennsylvania’s search and seizure jurisprudence.
A third significant case in this line of decisions is Commonwealth v.
Johnston.   In Johnston, the issue before the court was whether the132
“warrantless use of drug detection dogs in the corridors of leased storage areas
is permitted under Pennsylvania law.”   In a broader sense, the issue was133
whether or not the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Place  would apply in Pennsylvania.  In Place, the Court used a balancing134
test to determine whether or not the particular drug dog tactics (the “canine
sniff”) used in the case constituted a search.   In Johnston, another drug dog135
case with slightly dissimilar facts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused
to adopt the balancing approach to determine whether or not the incident at
issue was, in fact, a search.   Such tests, it concluded, were only appropriate136
in Terry situations where the exigencies involved would require quick
reactions by the police officer.   The court consequently held that the “canine137
sniff” falls into a Fourth Amendment “middle ground” and that the police
could only use drug detection dogs to test for the presence of narcotics in
limited circumstances.   While the court’s deviance from the federal standard138
was not explicitly predicated on article I, section 8, it necessarily must have
been so.  The court not only cited article I, section 8 in its analysis, but its
deviance from that standard indicated a consideration of factors beyond
federal law.  If the holding in Johnston rested solely on the Federal
Constitution, the court would technically not be free to deviate from the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Place.
The most recent case in which Supreme Court of Pennsylvania deviated
from federal precedent is Commonwealth v. Matos.   In Matos, the court,139
using an Edmunds analysis,  analyzed whether the United States Supreme140
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a crucial link in this line of cases.
141. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
142. Id. at 622.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 629.
145. Id.
146. Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 775-76 (Pa. 1996).
147. Id. at 775-76.
148. 614 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1992).  The issue in Rodriguez was “whether police officers may detain a
person in the vicinity of a drug raid absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion linking that individual
to the criminal activity under investigation.”  Id. at 1379.  The court held that detention in such
circumstances is unconstitutional.  Although the federal precedent argued was held to be inapplicable to
the case, the court in Rodriguez held that even assuming that federal case law was on point, the holding was
“based only upon principles of Pennsylvania jurisprudence as developed in accordance with our state
Constitution.”  Id. at 1384 n.9.
Court’s decision in California v. Hodari D.  would apply in Pennsylvania.141
In Hodari D., the defendant, upon pursuit by police officers, fled a crime
scene and was subsequently tackled and arrested.   Before he was142
apprehended, the defendant discarded a rock of crack cocaine which was later
recovered and confiscated by police.   The Court held that the evidence was143
not excludable because no arrest had been performed at the time the drugs
were discarded.   The pursuit by police did not involve any physical force144
with lawful authority or any submission to the assertion of such authority.145
Therefore, no seizure occurred.  In Matos, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
declined to adopt the federal definition of “seizure.”   In doing so, the court146
emphasized:
This Court has clearly and emphatically recognized that our citizens enjoy a
strong right of privacy, and that our citizens are therefore entitled to broader
protection in certain circumstances under our state constitution.
. . . .
Accordingly, we reject Hodari D. as incompatible with the privacy rights
guaranteed to the citizens of this Commonwealth under Article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.147
The court also emphasized the policy reasons in declining to adopt the holding
of Hodari D.  Citing Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,  the court noted that it148
had rejected in that case the contention that the goal of curtailing the drug
trade permits expansion of police intrusion without the constitutional
justification of reasonable suspicion or probable cause:
We emphatically reject the Superior Court’s “end justifies the means” analysis.  By
focusing its attention only upon the serious ills inflicted upon society by illegal
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149. Matos, 672 A.2d at 775-76 (emphasis added) (quoting Rodriguez, 614 A.2d at 1383).
narcotics, the Superior Court failed to recognize and respond to necessary
constitutional constraints on excessive police conduct.  The seriousness of criminal
activity under investigation, whether it is the sale of drugs or the commission of a
violent crime, can never be used as justification for ignoring or abandoning the
constitutional right of every individual in this Commonwealth to be free from
intrusions upon his or her personal liberty absent probable cause.149
5.  Case Law Conclusions
These two lines of cases interpreting article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and its applicability to illegal searches and seizures
reveal some clear principles.  First, probable cause is the standard that has
always been applied to routine traffic stops in Pennsylvania.  The only reason
for the confusion as of late is the misunderstanding of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s distinction between traffic stops and traditional Terry
situations where the reasonable suspicion standard still appropriately applies.
Any inconsistency found in the Vehicle Code between non-DUI and DUI
stops results not from the problem with the law, but from the problem of
having DUI statutes included in the Motor Vehicle Code itself.  DUI stops
may in fact be justified on a reasonable suspicion standard.  In this situation,
the facts of Terry are not as distant as they are in situations involving normal
traffic stops, where none of the elements of Terry are present: (1) there is no
reason to investigate further upon making the stop; (2) there is little, if any,
exigency; (3) there is no initial fear that the drivers of the vehicle are armed
and dangerous; and (4) the “criminal activity” that is afoot has already been
observed by the patrolling police officer, instantly giving him or her probable
cause to make the stop to issue the citation.  Not only has the distinction
between the two situations been effectively lost on the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, but the analysis starting all the way back with Murray and Swanger is
inconsistent.  Furthermore, any conclusions that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court “raised” the standard in cases like Whitmyer and Gleason are simply
wrong.  Those two cases merely reasserted what the supreme court has been
saying for the last thirty years: notwithstanding legislative intent to the
contrary, to make a valid traffic stop in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
a police officer must have probable cause that either the driver or his vehicle
is in violation of the Motor Vehicle Code.  And, most importantly, the
principle is one of constitutional law, not legislative enactment.
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150. Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979).
151. Id. at 1289 (citing Jerome B. Falk, Jr., The State Constitution: A More Than “Adequate”
Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. REV. 273, 283-84 (1973)).
152. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
The second line of cases discussed above reiterates the fact that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, more than most states in the Union, has deviated
from United States Supreme Court standards in cases where the express right
to privacy found in article I, section 8 is threatened by federal precedent.
Moreover, the pre- and post-Edmunds cases in this vein of jurisprudence
reveal that when the privacy interest embodied in the state constitution is
threatened, only serious societal interests may justify even limited intrusions
upon that right.  And, since the purposes of the Fourth Amendment and article
I, section 8 are markedly different, the policies justifying any deviance from
strict probable cause requirements will differ depending on which
constitutional provision is involved.
IV.  OTHER STATES’ TREATMENT OF TRAFFIC STOPS
No state, to my knowledge, has yet specifically addressed how its own
constitution independently treats the standard to make routine traffic stops.
Some inferences can be made from a few of the state cases, but before I turn
to them, I want to address the apposite federal standard.  In DeJohn,  the150
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted:
State judges, however, need not ignore the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court in opinions rejecting a comparable federal constitutional claim.  For a state
court interpreting a state constitution, opinions of the United States Supreme Court
are like opinions of sister state courts or lower federal courts.  While neither binding
in a constitutional sense nor precedential in a jurisprudential one, they are entitled
to whatever weight their reasoning and intellectual persuasiveness warrant.151
In assessing the limited federal case law on point in traffic stop situations, I
note here that, although it is clear that the Pennsylvania Constitution permits,
and possibly requires, that the state exceed a lower federal standard, the
federal standard itself may not even be a less protective one.  The United
States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the requisite standard to be
applied to routine traffic stops.  In the cases that come close, it is anything but
clear that reasonable suspicion is an acceptable standard.
In Delaware v. Prouse,  the Supreme Court presented the issue as152
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153. Id. at 650.  It is not clear whether the two standards enunciated here address separately the two
situations contemplated by the court.  A possible understanding of the issue presented is that “probable
cause to believe” relates to when “the car is being driven contrary to the laws governing the operation of
motor vehicles” and “reasonable suspicion” governs situations where “either the car or any of its occupants
is subject to seizure or detention in connection with the violation of other applicable law.”  Id.  If the
standards and the situations to which they apply are bifurcated in the sentence structure, this is certainly
a plausible reading.  If not, it is indeed a careless confusion of the two terms of art.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 663.
157. Id.  The court specifically held that “except in those situations in which there is at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered,
or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an
automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver’s license and the registration of the
automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 663.  Admittedly, this holding does not
squarely answer the issue that the court presented at the outset of the opinion.
whether it is an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to stop an automobile, being driven on a public highway, for the purpose of checking
the driving license of the operator and the registration of the car, where there is
neither probable cause to believe nor reasonable suspicion that the car is being
driven contrary to the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles or that either
the car or any of its occupants is subject to seizure or detention in connection with
the violation of any other applicable law.153
While it is unclear at first blush precisely what the two stated standards in this
passage refer to, the language contemplates an application of both probable
cause and reasonable suspicion.  In Prouse, a police officer stopped the
defendant in his automobile and, upon conversing with him, smelled
marijuana smoke and noticed a bag containing the drug in plain view on
defendant’s car floor.   At the suppression hearing, the police officer testified154
that he had “observed neither traffic or equipment violations nor any
suspicious activity, and that he made the stop only in order to check the
driver’s license and registration.”   The Court held that the evidence obtained155
from the seizure should have been excluded and affirmed the decision of the
Delaware Supreme Court that the stop was unconstitutional.   In doing so,156
the Court decided the case, as is common, on the narrowest possible grounds.
Where at least reasonable suspicion is not present, the stopping of an
automobile driver is unconstitutional.157
The Supreme Court’s reckless use of language in Prouse is disheartening.
While the Court’s holding seems to set reasonable suspicion as the pertinent
floor under which police officers cannot go, in the stated issue at the
beginning of the opinion and throughout the Court’s discussion, the language
is confused.  Later on, Justice White concludes:
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158. Id. at 661.
159. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
160. Id. at 808-09.
161. Id. at 813.
162. Id. at 810.
163. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
164. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.  No doubt the court here contemplated that in situations where the
police officer has reasonable suspicion that other criminal activity is afoot, or that the occupants of the
vehicle had participated in a crime, the stop could be reasonable under a Terry analysis.
When there is not probable cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of the
multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations—or other articulable basis
amounting to reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or his vehicle
unregistered—we cannot conceive of any legitimate basis upon which a patrolman
could decide that stopping a particular driver for a spot check would be more
productive than stopping any other driver.158
This language seems to fit the Court’s issue a bit better than its formal
holding, especially since the it mentions the probable cause standard and its
applicability.  However, it remains unclear from the Court’s analysis which
scenarios require probable cause and which scenarios require reasonable
suspicion.  Probable cause apparently fits somewhere in the mix, but the Court
refrained from telling us just where.
Quite a few years later, in Whren v. United States,  the Court again was159
presented with a traffic stop situation.   Rather than addressing the level of160
suspicion required, the Court instead addressed the validity of admittedly
pretextual stops.   At the outset, the Court pointed out that the parties had161
stipulated to the fact that the officer did have probable cause to stop the
defendant.   Also at the outset of the opinion, the Court, citing Prouse and162
Pennsylvania v. Mimms,  noted that “[a]s a general matter, the decision to163
stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”   While the specific issue of164
pretext addressed in Whren does not squarely concern my analysis here, the
Court’s analysis in upholding the seizure is relevant.  In concluding that
Prouse, regarding pretext, was not controlling in the case at hand, the Court
stated:
Our opinion in Prouse expressly distinguished the case from a stop based on
precisely what is at issue here: “probable cause to believe that a driver is violating
any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations.”  It noted
approvingly that “[t]he foremost method of enforcing traffic and vehicle safety
regulations . . . is acting upon observed violations,” which afford the “‘quantum of
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165. Id. at 817-18 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 659, 654-55 (1979)).
166. LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL OF PENNSYLVANIA—HOUSE, 185th of the General Assembly, at 1445-46
(July 8, 2003) (comments of Rep. Harper).
167. Commonwealth v. Sands, 887 A.2d 261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
individualized suspicion’” necessary to ensure that police discretion is sufficiently
constrained.165
The Court’s interpretation of Prouse here sheds some light on the
contemporary understanding of Whren’s holding.  As quoted above, the Court
noted the Prouse Court’s suggestion that the best way to protect against
abuses of police discretion is to require the police to act upon “observed
violations” that provide the “quantum of individualized suspicion” necessary
for the seizure to be reasonable.  That level of suspicion, albeit permissibly
pretextual since Whren, is likely probable cause.
V.  POLICY
The fourth prong of the Edmunds analysis requires a consideration of the
competing policy arguments underlying the issue involved.  There is no better
place to start than the statement of legislative intent underlying the amended
version of section 6308(b).  During deliberations of the bill that became the
current version of section 6308(b), one representative noted:
Pennsylvania courts have recently discarded the reasonable suspicion justification
for making traffic stops in DUI cases. . . .
. . . Gleason has created an untenable double standard for justifying traffic stops
in Pennsylvania.  Pennsylvania courts now require probable cause to make a traffic
stop based on a Vehicle Code offense while reasonable suspicion is sufficient for
other traffic stops. . . .
. . . .
. . . [F]inally, Mr. Speaker, in the bill currently under consideration, we have used
the phrase “reasonable suspicion” which satisfies the requirements of the United
States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution and accurately balances the
dangers of drunken driving with the right of any citizen to be secure in his person.166
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Sands,  in finding that the statute as167
applied in DUI cases did not violate either the Fourth Amendment or article
I, section 8, concluded:
Clearly, the legislature’s intent was to permit officers who suspect that an operator
of a vehicle has committed a serious offense, such as DUI or homicide by vehicle,
to stop the vehicle based upon a reasonable suspicion rather than the heightened
standard of probable cause . . . since existing constitutional precedent actually
360 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:331
168. Id. at 268.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 268.
permits police officers to stop a vehicle based upon reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.168
The problems with both the legislature’s interpretation of the law and with the
superior court’s assessment are glaring.  First, the legislature’s argument that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gleason “discarded” the reasonable
suspicion standard for DUI stops is plainly false.  The standard for traffic
stops under the Motor Vehicle Code has always been probable cause, and any
application of the reasonable suspicion standard in DUI situations only makes
sense because the Terry reasonable suspicion standard is relevant in that
scenario.  I must reiterate here that the apparent inconsistency between the
treatment of DUI and other traffic stops results not from an illogical or
“untenable” double standard imposed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
but from the legislature’s failure to realize the inherent difference between the
two.  As long as DUI violations remain part of the Motor Vehicle Code, and
stops for potential DUI violations are governed by the same Code, the
standard will remain, on its face, the same.
Secondly, the legislature misunderstands why the supreme court requires
“probable cause to make a traffic stop based on a Vehicle Code offense while
reasonable suspicion is sufficient for other traffic stops.”   This distinction169
goes all the way back to Murray and Swanger, and it was reaffirmed in
Whitmyer and Gleason.  Unfortunately, the superior court and many
practitioners have opted to discard it in their day-to-day suppression motion
analyses.  The distinction mirrors that in Terry.  Certain vehicle stops, when
it is suspected that real criminal activity is afoot, are justifiable under the
reasonable suspicion standard.  The court in Sands referenced this kind of a
situation when it alluded to “DUI or homicide by vehicle” crimes.   The170
superior court, although via a slightly misunderstood interpretation of the
legislature’s intent, correctly coupled DUI with vehicle by homicide rather
than with, say, driving at an unsafe speed.  DUI violations are better
analogized to non-Motor Vehicle Code “crimes,” particularly with regard to
the level of suspicion required to make an automobile stop because of a
perceived violation.  If the legislature comes to recognize this misalignment,
the “untenable” standard imposed by the state supreme court will no doubt
come into abrupt focus.
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reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.”).
173. Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 776 (Pa. 1996).
174. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818.
A second policy problem underlying the passage of amended section
6308(b) is the justification that the “dangers of drunk driving” and the safety
hazards they create are sufficient to warrant a lower standard.   While this171
may be true, this policy logically applies only to automobile stops where the
justification for the stop is a perceived violation of the DUI provision of the
Motor Vehicle Code.  Otherwise, the legislative intent behind the statute
would be to lower the standard that applies to all automobile stops, regardless
of their nature, in order to ease the prosecution of DUI violators.  This
objective presumes the constitutional validity of a pretextual stop.  Although
Whren disposes of the possibility of federal constitutional attacks on
pretextual automobile stops where there is probable cause,  such attacks172
under article I, section 8 are more credible.  Moreover, the commonwealth’s
interest in preventing the dangers posed by drunk drivers cannot, without
more, be enough to justify the intrusion involved here.  As the court stated in
Matos:
The seriousness of criminal activity under investigation, whether it is the sale of
drugs or the commission of a violent crime, can never be used as justification for
ignoring or abandoning the constitutional right of every individual in this
Commonwealth to be free from intrusions upon his or her personal liberty absent
probable cause.173
Given the express privacy interest implicated in article I, section 8, the breadth
of offenses that this provision of the Motor Vehicle Code covers, and the
inherently pretextual nature of the justification for lowering the standard, the
legislature is misguided in its blind assertion that the seriousness of alcohol-
related traffic dangers justifies its enactment of section 6308(b).
At least two additional significant policy interests weigh against the
constitutionality of section 6308(b).  The first concerns the inherently
pretexutal nature of traffic stops.  At the federal level, the Supreme Court held
in Whren that the motivations of the police officer upon performing a traffic
stop do not matter as long as probable cause is objectively present.   In its174
holding, the Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment only requires
probable cause, and that no interest-balancing is necessary as long as probable
cause exists and the conduct of the officer during the search and seizure is not
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175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 819.
178. One scholar, in commenting on the dangers of the Whren standard, has emphasized:
Once the police possess probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred they have the
unfettered discretion of whether to stop the motorist, to issue a summons or arrest the suspected
traffic offender, what ticket or tickets to issue, and will enjoy a virtual guarantee of conviction
in court.  Because the outcome of the criminal or quasi-criminal process in a traffic case begins
and the final outcome of the case is de facto determined during the stop itself, it is clear that the
law governing the traffic stop is the only law material to the case.  In essence, when the police
stop a motorist and issue a summons, any subsequent activity in court is merely a “fiction,” a
process that has no meaning other then [sic] the process itself, as the actual outcome of the case
was decided at the conclusion of the traffic stop.
Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of Men?, 50 CLEV. ST. L.
extraordinary or extreme.   The Court noted that “[t]he making of a traffic175
stop . . . does not remotely qualify as such an extreme practice, and so is
governed by the usual rule that probable cause to believe the law has been
broken ‘outbalances’ private interest in avoiding police contact.”   The176
conclusion here is not surprising, particularly given the fact that the Supreme
Court has never found an explicit privacy interest directly implicated by the
Fourth Amendment.  Still, even though a pretexutal purpose for the stop will
be upheld, probable cause remains the standard.
As I have noted above, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
consistently interpreted article I, section 8 to embody an individual privacy
right, and stated that the privacy interests of Pennsylvania citizens do in fact
outweigh the need for police officers to be able to make traffic stops at whim.
Especially in cases of suspected DUI, reasonable suspicion of a drunk driving
violation may indeed be enough to warrant a stop.  An arbitrary lowering of
the standard to allow the police to seize a driver based on any perceived, or
probably perceived, traffic violation does nothing to enhance the safety of the
roads of the commonwealth.  It does, however, infringe on a right that has
been recognized in Pennsylvania since a time predating the Fourth
Amendment itself.  Furthermore, the problem at the state level now goes
beyond the situation in Whren.  Pretext in Whren was acceptable because
probable cause was first acquired by the police officer.   Now, relying on177
section 6308(b), a police officer in Pennsylvania can have a wholly pretexutal
purpose for stopping a driver on less than probable cause.  The risk of pretext
is far greater than even that afforded by the federal standard—a
counterintuitive result given the fact that article I, section 8 unquestioningly
affords the citizens of Pennsylvania greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment.  This is a precarious situation, to say the least.178
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179. See, e.g., Peter Shakow, Note, Let He Who Never Has Turned Without Signaling Cast the First
Stone: An Analysis of Whren v. United States, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 627, 643 (1997); Janet Koven Levit,
Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145,
187 (1996).
180. Shakow, supra note 179, at 643.  The author points out:
The police must be able to articulate a legitimate rationale for the stop if it is adequately
questioned, for the practical purpose of unburdening innocent motorists, and, more broadly, to
avoid undermining societal confidence in our law enforcement personnel and our legal system.
Such confidence erodes quickly when unequal enforcement is rule, not the exception.
Id.
181. Levit, supra note 179, at 187.
182. Id. at 186.  The author notes:
This Article examines automobile stops.  In that context, both investigative impulses and
impulses to enforce traffic laws play out in identical ways—stopping (seizing) an automobile
and its passengers.  This complete congruity makes the stop virtually impossible to parse.  Thus,
on a blank slate, the most promising resolution to the pretext problem lies at a point beyond the
initial stop, during any subsequent search or seizure that may follow the stop, where the
distinctness of the investigative stop and the traffic stop may again manifest itself.
Id.
183. See, e.g., Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae Williams, Toward a State Constitutional Check on
Police Discretion to Patrol the Fourth Amendment’s Outer Frontier: A Subjective Test for Pretextual
Several scholars have pointed out the dangers of pretextual stops,
particularly since the decision in Whren.   A preeminent danger stems from179
the sheer number of pretextual stops performed daily by law enforcement.
Because traffic encounters with police officers occur often, one author has
noted that confidence in the law enforcement system is at risk when the stops
are arbitrary and without rational explanation.   Moreover, another author180
has argued that the decision in Whren, with its reliance on a purely objective
standard regulating police officers’ discretion, virtually signaled the death of
Terry: “When we allow the police carte blanche authority to use minor traffic
violations as a pretext to stop an individual to search for evidence to support
reasonable suspicion of a more serious crime, we nullify Terry’s first
prong.”   The author also pointed out a distinction that state courts in181
particular have failed to make for quite some time—the distinction between
a traffic stop and an investigative detention.   While they may look identical182
at the outset (and most courts have stopped here), the searches that they
validate are drastically different.  Thus, the justification of an “investigative
detention” standard for traffic stops does not make sense, especially when the
“reasonable suspicion” supporting the stop is subterfuge.
Because of the pretext problem, some scholars have encouraged state
courts to form their own pretext doctrines, especially if they are permitted to
independently construe their own state constitutional provisions.183
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Seizures, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1007 (1996).  The authors developed a proposed quasi-subjective test for use
by state courts.
184. 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999).
185. Id. at 837.
186. Id.  The court concluded that the state constitutional provision “holds the line by pegging the
constitutional standard to ‘those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be
entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Myrick, 688 P.2d
151, 154 (Wash. 1984)).
187. WASH. CONST., art. I, § 7.
188. Ladson, 979 P.2d at 842.
189. Id. at 843 (Madsen, J., dissenting). 
190. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.64.015 (2006).
191. Ladson, 979 P.2d at 843 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
Washington has been the leading state to undertake an independent state
analysis of its own search and seizure doctrine.  In State v. Ladson,  the184
Washington Supreme Court decided whether pretextual traffic stops violate
article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, that state’s analogue to the
Fourth Amendment.  The court held that Washington’s constitutional
provision affords broader protection than the Fourth Amendment and provides
Washington citizens a “right to privacy with no express limitations.”185
Furthermore, the court noted that Washington does not engage in the same
kind of interest-balancing that is undertaken by the United States Supreme
Court.   Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibits police186
from making stops without the appropriate “authority of law.”   The court in187
Ladson concluded that pretextual traffic stops violate that provision because
they constitute seizures without the authority of law provided by a warrant.188
One portion of the court’s opinion in Ladson is particularly significant
here.  The dissent in the case argued that the “authority of law” required by
the constitution could be provided by statute.   Washington has a statute, one189
very similar to section 6308(b), giving authority to police officers to make
traffic stops and issue traffic citations.   Because the dissent believed that the190
statute was sufficient to provide the requisite authority of law, it concluded
that article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution did not take pretext
into account when assessing the constitutionality of a traffic stop.   The191
majority responded:
“[C]ases from the earliest days of statehood indicate search warrants were issued
pursuant to statutory authorization.”  That is to say, “statutory authorization”
references a statute authorizing a court to issue a warrant, not a statute dispensing
with the warrant requirement.  Except in the rarest of circumstances, the “authority
of law” required to justify a search pursuant to article I, section 7 consists of a valid
search warrant or subpoena issued by a neutral magistrate.  This court has never
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193. Texas and Wyoming have also made similar conclusions to those in Ladson.  See Leary &
Williams, supra note 183, at 1026-27.
found that a statute requiring a procedure less than a search warrant or subpoena
constitutes “authority of law” justifying an intrusion into the “private affairs” of its
citizens.  This defies the very nature of our constitutional scheme and would set a
precedent of legislative deference that I am unwilling to accept in our state’s
constitutional jurisprudence.  It is the court, not the Legislature, that determines the
scope of our constitutional protections.192
Thus, the court, in refusing to recognize the legislature’s authority to create
exceptions to Washington’s warrant requirement, held that the sufficiency of
the “authority of law” validating seizures performed pursuant to statutory
grants of authority are to be assessed by the court, not the legislature.
The situation in Pennsylvania is similar.  The superior court, especially
in Sands, determined that the constitutional standards previously announced
by the state supreme court were no longer applicable because they were
analyzed under the pre-amendment statutory provisions.  What the state of
Washington recognized in Ladson, and Pennsylvania should recognize here,
is that the reasonableness requirement for police seizures of individuals
predates any granting of statutory authority by the state legislature.  The
warrant requirement in Pennsylvania not only predates any version of section
6308(b), but it predates the Fourth Amendment itself.  Ladson is therefore
relevant to the inquiry here in two ways.  First, it shows that other states which
similarly interpret their constitutional provisions to afford greater protections
than their federal counterparts have not followed Whren specifically because
of the dangers that pretext presents.   Second, it reiterates the proposition193
that the court—not the legislature—determines the standards governing rights
embodied in the state constitution.
VI.  CONCLUSION
There is perhaps no other area of constitutional jurisprudence that is more
confused than that dealing with the semantic (or, arguably, very real)
differences between the probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards
governing seizures of individuals by police officers.  Particularly in traffic
stop cases, the narrow Terry standard requiring reasonable suspicion has been
quickly and haphazardly applied without much consideration of the doctrinal
or policy problems associated with these stops.  The Pennsylvania Legislature
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has not escaped the confusion.  In amending section 6308(b), it has fallen prey
to the misguided notion that the probable cause standard established in
Pennsylvania is relatively new and malleable.  However, upon closer
examination, it is emphatically the case that the probable cause requirement
to make traffic stops in Pennsylvania is a matter of constitutional law that
cannot be altered by legislative whim.  The location of the DUI statute in the
Motor Vehicle Code presents clear problems when trying to decipher what
standard should govern stops made for suspected violations.  A Terry-type
standard makes some—even good—sense in these situations as the “criminal
activity” going on is of a more serious sort than a minor traffic infraction.
However, as it is included in the Motor Vehicle Code, stops are subject to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s probable cause standard.
The legislature’s discontent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
“double standard” is thus self-created and cannot be remedied by a simple
amendment to section 6308(b) which, like every other statue on the books in
the Commonwealth, is subject to constitutional scrutiny.  What we inevitably
end up with in section 6308(b), then, is a lower standard, perhaps even lower
than the federal standard; that is inherently pretextual; that invades the
independent right of privacy recognized under article I, section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution; and that does nothing but confuse both the letter
and spirit of constitutional criminal procedure law.  And what is more, it does
so in furtherance of not a single colorable state policy.  The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania will hopefully get the opportunity to once and for all settle the
law in this area and create an example for other states to follow.  In doing so,
it can reassure the citizens of Pennsylvania that the rights of privacy and
protection embodied in article I, section 8 do in fact extend beyond their own
driveways.
